On Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Mind’: the self-knowing, actual Idea — part seven.
‘Psyche; or, the legend of Love’: Canto I
by Mary Tighe (1772–1810)
Preface.
Let not the rugged brow the rhymes accuse,
Which speak of gentle knights and ladies fair,
Nor scorn the lighter labours of the muse,
Who yet, for cruel battles would not dare
The low-strung chords of her weak lyre prepare;
But loves to court repose in slumbery lay,
To tell of goodly bowers and gardens rare,
Of gentle blandishments and amorous play,
And all the lore of love, in courtly verse essay.
And ye, whose gentle hearts in thraldom held
The power of mighty Love already own,
When you the pains and dangers have beheld,
Which erst your lord hath for his Psyche known,
For all your sorrows this may well atone,
That he you serve the same hath suffered;
And sure, your fond applause the tale will crown
In which your own distress is pictured,
And all that weary way which you yourselves must tread.
Most sweet would to my soul the hope appear,
That sorrow in my verse a charm might find,
To smooth the brow long bent with bitter cheer,
Some short distraction to the joyless mind
Which grief, with heavy chain, hath fast confined
To sad remembrance of its happier state;
For to myself I ask no boon more kind
Than power another’s woes to mitigate,
And that soft soothing art which anguish can abate.
And thou, sweet sprite, whose sway doth far extend,
Smile on the mean historian of thy fame!
My heart in each distress and fear befriend,
Nor ever let it feel a fiercer flame
Than innocence may cherish free from blame,
And hope may nurse, and sympathy may own;
For, as thy rights I never would disclaim,
But true allegiance offered to thy throne,
So may I love but one, by one beloved alone.
That anxious torture may I never feel,
Which, doubtful, watches o’er a wandering heart.
Oh! who that bitter torment can reveal,
Or tell the pining anguish of that smart!
In those affections may I ne’er have part,
Which easily transferred can learn to rove:
No, dearest Cupid! when I feel thy dart,
For thy sweet Psyche’s sake may no false love
The tenderness I prize lightly from me remove!
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770–1831). ‘Philosophy of Mind’. ‘Natural Soul’.
§393
(2) The universal planetary life of the natural mind particularizes itself into the concrete differences of the earth and breaks up into the particular natural minds which, on the whole, express the nature of the geographical regions of the world and constitute the diversities of race.
[Remark] The opposition of terrestrial polarity, in virtue of which the land towards the north is more concentrated and predominates over the sea, whereas in the southern hemisphere it tapers off into separate sharp points, introduces into the differences of world-regions a further modification which Treviranus (Biology, Vol. 11) has demonstrated in the case of the flora and fauna.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus published his ‘Biologie, oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur für Naturforscher und Ärzte (Biology, or Philosophy of Living Nature for Natural Scientists and Physicians) in Göttingen between 1802 and 1822. Hegel frequently cites him in the ‘Philosophy of Nature’, for example §344. Hegel describes the question of human origins as a historische and not a geschichtliche question. Geschichte and geschichtlich are his preferred words for history and historical, while he frequently uses the words Historie and historisch somewhat dismissively for that which is unsystematic and simply empirical. The question of human origins cannot be a question for Geschichte in virtue of this being dependent upon written records.
‘With respect to the diversity of races of mankind it must be noticed first of all that the merely historical question, whether all human races sprang from one couple or from several, is of no concern whatever to us in philosophy. Importance was attached to this question because it was believed that by assuming descent from several couples, the mental superiority of one human stock over another could be explained, indeed, it was hoped to prove that human beings are by nature so diverse in their mental capacities that some may be dominated like animals. But descent affords no ground for the entitlement or non-entitlement of human beings to freedom and to dominion. Man is implicitly rational; herein lies the possibility of equality of right for all men,-the futility of a rigid distinction between races that have rights and those that have none. — The difference between the races of mankind is still a natural difference, that is, a difference that initially concerns the natural soul. As such, the difference is connected with the geographical differences of the territory where human beings congregate in large masses. These differences of territory are what we call world-regions’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Human equality not being natural will be discussed later, §539. The geographical basis of history he discusses elsewhere:
‘Universal history — as already demonstrated — shows the development of the consciousness of Freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent realization of that Freedom. This development implies a gradation — a series of increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations of Freedom, which result from its Idea. The logical, and — as still more prominent — the dialectical nature of the Idea in general, viz. that it is self-determined — that it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process of transcending its earlier stages gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a richer and more concrete shape; — this necessity of its nature, and the necessary series of pure abstract forms which the Idea successively assumes — is exhibited in the department of Logic. Here we need adopt only one of its results, viz. that every step in the process, as differing from any other, has its determinate peculiar principle. In history this principle is idiosyncrasy of Spirit — peculiar National Genius. It is within the limitations of this idiosyncrasy that the spirit of the nation, concretely manifested, expresses every aspect of its consciousness and will — the whole cycle of its realization. Its religion, its polity, its ethics, its legislation, and even its science, art, and mechanical skill, all bear its stamp. These special peculiarities find their key in that common peculiarity — the particular principle that characterizes a people; as, on the other hand, in the facts which History presents in detail, that common characteristic principle may be detected. That such or such a specific quality constitutes the peculiar genius of a people, is the element of our inquiry which must be derived from experience, and historically proved. To accomplish this, presupposes not only a disciplined faculty of abstraction, but an intimate acquaintance with the Idea’.
- ‘Philosophy of History’
Differences between the continents of the Old World are necessary given that they form a triad of the universal — particular — individual type whereby Africa is an undifferentiated unity, Asia an unmediated contrast between highlands and river valleys, and Europe a differentiated unity of interpenetrating mountains and valleys. Classifications of human races were attempted by Carolus Linnaeus, (1707–78), and by Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon. (1707–88), however Hegel acquired his information about skulls from Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), an anatomist and anthropologist, who became known as the father of physical anthropology. In his ‘De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa’, 1775, (‘On the Natural Variety of the Human Race’), he distinguished five races: Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Malayan, and American. The name Caucasian was applied to the white race which Blumenbach believed to come from the Caucasus region. He collected sixty skulls of various races, and these were published in his ‘Collectionis Diversorum Gentium Illustratae Decades’ (1790–1828) (Parts of his ‘Collection of Crania of Various Races’). Hegel’s official criterion for distinguishing the races, the angle of intersection of the horizontal and vertical lines drawn within the skull, is a refinement of the cephalometric lines introduced by Adriaan van der Spiegel. (1578–1625). A later refinement was the cranial index devised by Anders Adolf Retzius (1796–1860) in 1846, the ratio of skull width to skull length.
‘After having thus attempted to show that the differences between the continents are not contingent but necessary, we wish to determine, in a physical and spiritual respect, the racial diversities of humanity connected with these geographical differences. In the physical respect, physiology distinguishes the Caucasian, Ethiopian, and Mongolian races, and there are also the race of Malaya and of America, though these form an aggregate of infinitely various particularities rather than a sharply distinct race. Now the physical difference between all these races is shown mainly in the formation of the skull and the face’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Hegel does not think that the psychological characteristics that he attributes to Africans are hereditary as their physical characteristics are, they are connected with the geography of Africa. However, we must bear in mind that anthropology was in its infancy in his day. As he writes elsewhere:
‘The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to it, we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas — the category of Universality. In African life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence — as for example, God, or Law — in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his own being. This distinction between himself as an individual and the universality of his essential being, the African in the uniform, undeveloped oneness of his existence has not yet attained; so that the Knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a Higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting’.
- ‘Philosophy of History’
Is it though? Hegel discusses Asia and oriental religions in §377, he believed a religion or a conception of God is essentially related to a conception of the person, and with the value and rights assigned to the person. On the concrete universal in contrast to the ‘abstract universal see §387. An abstract universal is slender and empty, therefore one is tempted to identify it with an individual, in Buddhism, or with nature as a whole, in Hinduism, though Hegel may be mixing up the creator god, Brahma, with a Brahmin Brahman, a member of the caste from which priests were drawn but who was not regarded as a god.
‘.. with the Tibetans, where often a child is chosen as the present god, .. when such a god dies, the monks seek another god among mankind; but all these gods enjoy the profoundest veneration one after the other. The essentials of this religion reach as far as the Indians, among whom a human being, the Brahman, is likewise regarded as God, and the withdrawal of the human mind into its indeterminate universality is held to be the divine, to be the immediate identity with God. So in the Asiatic race mind is certainly already beginning to awake, to separate itself from naturalness. But this separation is not yet clear-cut, not yet absolute. Mind does not yet grasp itself in its absolute freedom, does not yet know itself as the concrete universal that is for itself, has not yet made its concept into its object in the form of thought. For this reason mind still exists in the form of immediate individuality, a form in contradiction with mind. God does indeed become an object for them, but not in the form of the absolutely free thought, but in that of an immediately existent finite mind. With this is connected the worship of the dead that occurs here. This involves an elevation above naturalness, for in the dead naturalness has perished; the remembrance of them holds fast only to the universal that appeared in them and thus rises above the individuality of the appearance’
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’.
What is needed for a universal to be concrete is a particularization that mediates its relationship to the empirical world but for this to occur the universal must particularize or develop itself and this requires that the mind become genuinely independent of nature and that it make its concept into its object. This applies also to an individual mind whereby an infant, with its undeveloped mind, absorbed in its immediate surroundings, is barely in control of its body and makes little sense of, and has little mastery over, the external world and as its mind becomes more independent of its immediate surroundings and acquires more awareness of itself it makes sense of and masters its environment. That the mind properly connects with what is other than mind only when it is fully independent of it exemplifies Hegel’s principle that opposites turn into each other at their extreme points. See the ‘Encyclopaedia Logic’, §81.
‘It is in the Caucasian race that mind first attains to absolute unity with itself; here for the first time mind enters into complete opposition to naturalness, apprehends itself in its absolute independence, breaks free from the oscillation between one extreme and the other, achieves self-determination, self-development, and thereby produces world-history. The Mongols, as we have already mentioned, have for their character only the outwards-storming activity of an inundation, which dies away as quickly as it came, acts only destructively, constructs nothing, produces no advance in world-history. This advance comes about only through the Caucasian race. In the Caucasian race, however, we have to distinguish two sides, the Western Asiatics and the European; this distinction now coincides with the distinction of Mohammedans and Christians’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Mohammedans have no inclination to identify God with the empirical world or with some entity in it but their failure to particularize their abstractly universal God goes with a failure to develop a differentiated political system and a tendency to oscillate between religious self-denial and the relentless pursuit of worldly aims. Hegel does distinguish West Asiatics from Europeans by physiological criteria, rather for him as for his contemporaries Mohammedanism and Judaism were primarily religious categories and in particular the classification of Jews as a physiologically distinct race is a later development somewhat alien to the founders of physical anthropology.
God or thought or the universal is self-determining and can thus unite with the particular, a process expressed in the representation of the Trinity. Non-Christian religions do not display the immanent development characteristic of thought and something similar happens on the secular plane, the mind frees itself from the world then returns to imbue it with thought, it masters the world by acting on universal principles and develops a differentiated state. There is an alternative view of course, concerning the relationship between Christianity and science. Anthony Quinton,(1925–2010) argued that modern science was made possible by the Christian idea of a rational God ‘behind the perceptible surface of the world’ but governing it ‘in accordance with a unitary system of intelligible laws’ (‘Religion and Science’, 1998)
A rather risible idea, without Christianity no science:
The Scientific Revolution took off around the 16th century AD (repeating much of prior Islamic science as it happens). Christianity had been around for a long time .. maybe something else was going on to kickstart science.
‘Europeans, on the contrary, have for their principle and character the concrete universal, the self-determining thought. The Christian God is not merely the undifferentiated One, but the triune God who contains difference within himself, who has become man, who reveals himself. In this religious representation the opposition of universal and particular, of thought and reality, has supreme intensity and is nevertheless brought back to unity. Here, then, the particular is not left so quiescent in its immediacy as in Mohammedanism; on the contrary, it is determined by thought, just as, conversely, the universal here develops itself to particularization. The principle of the European mind is, therefore, self-conscious reason, which has the confidence in itself that for it nothing can be an insuperable barrier, and which therefore invades everything in order to become present to itself therein. The European mind opposes the world to itself, makes itself free of it, but again sublates this opposition, takes its Other, the manifold, back into itself, into its simplicity. Here, therefore, there prevails this infinite thirst for knowledge, which is alien to the other races’.
As for native Americans:
‘But finally, with regard to the original Americans, we have to remark that they are a vanishing, feeble breed. It is true that in some parts of America at the time of its discovery, a considerable culture was to be found; this, however, was not comparable with European culture and has disappeared with the original inhabitants. In addition, the dullest savages dwell there, e.g. the Pecherais and Eskimos. The Caribs of earlier times are almost completely extinct. When made familiar with brandy and fire-arms, these savages become extinct’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
§394
This differentiation descends into particularities, which may be termed local minds, shown in the outward modes of life, occupation, bodily structure and disposition, but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and ethical character of the several peoples.
[Remark] As far back as the history of peoples extends, we see the particular nations each possessing a persistent type of its own.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
The racial variations of §393 are determined by the concept in that Africans are abstractly and uniformly universal, Asiatics (including Mohammedans) are particularized into an abstractly universal deity and unredeemed particularity, and Europeans restore the unity of universality and particularity into individuality. Hegel frequently accommodates four elements by treating one as of less significance or five by grouping three together, see §401 on the five senses. Further differentiations of the natural mind, not into races (Rassen) but peoples (Völker), are not determined by the concept, though triads are also evoked. These differences are allocated to two sciences, first, the natural history of man describes and explains national and local characteristics, and second, the philosophy of history portrays the spiritual climax of a people’s underlying natural character, its culture and historic deeds. Philosophical anthropology, which is Hegel’s present concern, is distinct from these sciences and supplies only as much of the first as is required for an understanding of the second.
On the Hindu caste system:
‘In … the Indian realm — we see the unity of political organization — a perfect civil machinery, such as exists in China — in the first instance, broken up. The several powers of society appear as dissevered and free in relation to each other. The different castes are indeed, fixed ; but in view of the religious doctrine that established them, they wear the aspect of natural distinctions. Individuals are thereby still further stripped of proper personality — although it might appear as if they derived gain from the development of the distinctions in question. For though we find the organization of the State no longer, as in China, determined and arranged by the one all-absorbing personality [the head of the State] the distinctions that exist are attributed to Nature, and so become differences of Caste. The unity in which these divisions must finally meet, is a religious one; and thus arises Theocratic Aristocracy and its despotism. Here begins, therefore, the distinction between the spiritual consciousness and secular conditions; but as the separation implied in the above mentioned distinctions is the cardinal consideration, so also we find in the religion the principle of the isolation of the constituent elements of the Idea; — a principle which posits the harshest antithesis — the conception of the purely abstract unity of God, and of the purely sensual Powers of Nature. The connection of the two is only a constant change — a restless hurrying from one extreme to the other — a wild chaos of fruitless variation, which must appear as madness to a duly regulated, intelligent consciousness’.
- ‘Philosophy of History’
The ‘Philosophy of History considers differences between China, India, etc., but not between different black African peoples.. anthroplogy was in its infancy. Hegel’s words for Germanic peoples, germanic are Germanen, germanisch(en), derived from the Latin germania, germanus, are different from the normal word for german, deutsch. They incorporate, besides Germans proper (the Deutschen), peoples speaking Germanic languages (such as the English and Scandinavians) and also Romance-speaking peoples such as the French, Spanish, and Italians. All are germanic, because the Roman Empire was overrun by German tribes in the fifth century AD, which Hegel goes into in the ‘Philosophy of History’.
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Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit Für das deutsche Vaterland! Danach laßt uns alle streben Brüderlich mit Herz und Hand!
And in times of misfortune And in times of mistrust Shall this song continue, (von der Maas bis an die Memel) From generation to generation, (von der Etsch bis an den Belt) From present to past Shall this song continue, (Deutschland über alles, Deutschland) More than ever, (über alles in der Welt) In these times of mistrust
After the unspeakable After you have fallen as only angels can fall Go and find your peace again Get back home and grow your tree No victory, no defeat, no shame And fatherland no more Only unity, Justice and freedom for all
There will be no memory Or there will be no hope It is the lesson you have to learn Now and in the future Do you think you can make it, Deutschland?
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‘As regards the Greeks, the particularly outstanding peoples among them in the period of their full world-historical development-the Lacedemonians, the Thebans, and the Athenians-are distinguished from each other as follows. With the Lacedemonians, the upright undifferentiated life in the ethical substance predominates: with them, therefore, property and the family relationship do not receive their due. With the Thebans, on the other hand, the opposite principle emerges; with them the subjective, sentimentality, so far as the Greeks can yet be credited with this at all, preponderates. The finest lyrical poet of the Greeks, Pindar, belongs to the Thebans. The friendship-league of youths, bound to each other in life and in death, which developed among the Thebans, also affords evidence of the withdrawal into the inwardness of sentiment which prevailed among this people. The Athenian people, however, display the unity of these opposites; in them, mind has emerged from the Theban subjectivity without losing itself in the Spartan objectivity of ethical life; with the Athenians the rights of the state and of the individual found as perfect a unification as was possible at all at the standpoint of the Greeks. But just as Athens, through this mediation of the Spartan and Theban minds forms the unity of northern and southern Greece, so also we see in that state the union of the eastern and western Greeks, in so far as Plato in Athens defined the absolute as the Idea, in which both the natural element made into the absolute in Ionian philosophy, and the wholly abstract thought forming the principle of Italic philosophy, are reduced to moments. With these intimations regarding the character of the principal peoples of Greece we must be content here; to develop further what has been intimated would encroach on the territory of world-history and especially of the history of philosophy too’.
- Philosophy of Mind’
The Greek nation was divided into many small city-states, of which the most important were Sparta, Thebes, and Athens. Hegel follows the practice common both in antiquity and today of using Lacedemonians as equivalent to Spartans. He briefly describes Spartan institutions, including communal meals and restrictions on the disposal of property, in the ‘Philosophy of History’, where he distinguishes the Spartans, the inhabitants of the city, from the Lacedemonians, the perioeci or dwellers round about who lived in the region under Spartan control, Laconia, and were dependent on Sparta in external affairs but retained considerable local autonomy. The perioeci are distinct from the helots, serfs working the land of the Spartans. Ethical substance implicitly contrasts with subject and implies that the Spartans were not developed as individuals but immersed in their institutions.
Thebes became the dominant state in Greece after the Thebans under Epaminondas defeated the Spartans at Leuctra in. 371 BC but Theban hegemony did not survive the death of Epaminondas in the battle of Mantinea in 362. In the ‘Philosophy of History’ Hegel takes Theban dependence on Epaminondas as one more sign of their subjectivity. He regards lyric poetry, whose greatest practitioner was the fifth-century Theban Pindar, as the ‘expression of subjectivity’. Around 377 BCThebes created the Sacred Band, a force of 300 hoplites or heavy-armed infantry fighting in close formation, to form the spearhead of the Theban army. Each had his closest friend beside him, so that the band consisted of 150 pairs of comrades, ready to fight and die together. It is the efficacy of these amatory bonds that Hegel regards as evidence of Theban subjectivity.
Athens is a mean between two extremes: Sparta to the south, with its objectivity of ethical life and the state, and Thebes to the north, with its subjectivity and individualism. It is also a mean between the eastern, Ionian, Greeks of the coast of Asia Minor and its islands, and the western Greeks of Italy. The Ionian philosophers were materialists, finding the absolute in some natural substance, such as water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), or fire (Heraclitus), of which they supposed everything ultimately to consist. The western philosophers found their principle in an abstract thought, such as being or the one (Parmenides) or number (Pythagoras). Plato attempted to combine the natural element and abstract thought as moments in his own philosophy.
Hegel sees the Platonic Idea as effecting this synthesis, since the Idea is, in Hegel’s vocabulary, the ‘concept’ together with its ‘reality’: cf. §377, n. 4. Many of the Greeks in Italy originally came from the East as refugees from Lydian and, later, Persian pressure. Pythagoras left Samos, ruled by the tyrant Polycrates, and settled in Croton, in southern Italy. Xenophanes left Colophon, on the coast of Asia Minor, for Elea, on the west coast of Italy. Not all western Greek philosophers fit Hegel’s stereotype: Empedocles of Akragas (Agrigento), in Sicily, was a materialist, believing things to consist of four elements: earth, air, fire, and water.
‘An even greater diversity of national character is to be seen in the Christian peoples of Europe. The fundamental determination in the nature of these peoples is the predominant inwardness, the subjectivity firm within itself. This is modified mainly according to the southern or northern situation of the countries inhabited by these peoples. In the south, individuality uninhibitedly emerges in its idiosyncrasy. This is especially true of the Italians; with them the individual character will not be other than just what it is; universal purposes do not disturb its uninhibitedness. Such a character is more appropriate to the feminine nature than to the masculine. Italian individuality has, therefore, flowered into its finest beauty in feminine individuality; not infrequently Italian women and maidens, who were unhappy in love, have died of grief in a single instant; so much had their whole nature entered into the individual relationship, whose breaking-off annihilated them. Connected with this uninhibitedness of individuality is also the strong gesticulation of the Italians; their mind spills over without reserve into its bodiliness’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Hegel employs two approximate synonyms, Individualität and Einzelheit, see §377, often translated together with their cognates as individual(ity), but sometimes a distinction has to be drawn. Individualität as individuality. Einzelheit as idiosyncracy. Idiosyncracy is uninhibited by universal purposes whereas Individualität might be governed by general norms even if it is not in this case.
‘With the Spaniards similarly we find the predominance of individuality; but this does not have the Italian uninhibitedness but is already associated more with reflection. The individual content which is here asserted already bears the form of universality. That is why we see honour in particular to be the driving principle with Spaniards. Here the individual demands recognition, not in his immediate idiosyncracy, but on account of the agreement of his actions and conduct with certain fixed principles which, according to the conception of the nation, must be law for every man of honour. But since the Spaniard is guided in all his activity by these principles which transcend the whims of the individual and have not yet been undermined by the sophistry of the intellect, he attains to greater steadfastness than the Italian, who obeys more the inspirations of the moment and lives more in sentiment than in firm representations. This difference between the two peoples is specially prominent in connection with religion. The Italian does not let religious scruples especially interfere with his cheerful enjoyment of life. The Spaniard, on the other hand, has hitherto adhered with fanatical zeal to the letter of Catholic doctrine and for centuries, through the Inquisition, has persecuted with African inhumanity those suspected of deviating from this letter’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind.
With African inhumanity, is mit afrikanischer Unmenschlichkeit, probably alludes to the earlier Islamic conquest of Spain.
‘Now whereas with the Italians mobility of sentiment predominates, and in Spaniards firmness of representative thinking, the French display both firmness of intellect and mobility of wit. The French have always been reproached with frivolity, also with vanity, the desire to please. But through striving to please, they have brought social culture to an extreme of refinement and by virtue of just this have raised themselves in a remarkable way above the crude selfishness of the natural man; for this culture consists precisely in not forgetting the others, with whom one is dealing, in favour of oneself, but in taking them into account and showing oneself well disposed towards them. Both to the individual and to the public, the French- be they statesmen, artists, or scholars-accord the most respectful attention in all their actions and works. Yet occasionally this deference to the opinion of others has of course degenerated into the effort to please at all costs, even at the expense of truth. This striving has also given rise to ideal chatter boxes. But what the French regard as the surest means of giving universal pleasure is what they call esprit. This esprit is restricted in superficial natures to associating ideas only remotely connected, but in intelligent men, such as Montesquieu and Voltaire for example, esprit becomes, by bringing together what the intellect has separated, a brilliant form of the rational; for the essential feature of the rational is just to bring together what is separated. But this form of the rational is still not that of conceptual cognition; the profound, clever thoughts which are to be found in abundance in men like those we have mentioned, are not developed from one universal thought, from the concept of the subject-matter, but are thrown out like flashes of lightning. The acuteness of the French intellect is revealed in the clarity and determinacy of expression, in speech and writings alike. Their rigorously rule-governed language corresponds to the orderliness and conciseness of their thoughts’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Esprit is the closest French equivalent of the German Geist but esprit suggests wit, while Geist suggests profundity, though it acquired the connotation of wit under the influence of esprit. Hence Hegel is here supporting his claim about French wit. In bringing together what the intellect (Verstand) separates, esprit resembles reason and the rational (das Vernünftige), but it does not amount to conceptual cognition. But remember Charles de Montesquieu, whose ‘De l’Esprit des Lois’, 1748, (‘On the Spirit of the Laws’) exerted a considerable influence on Hegel. See ‘Philosophy of Right’, §3, 261, 273. Here Hegel supports his claim that the French display firmness of intellect as well as wit. In the Revolution, the French intellect took one-sided principles to extremes, one-sidedness being a characteristic of intellect but this resulted in the sublation of one-sidednesses in the Napoleonic state and this sublation itself was the work not of the French intellect but of the dialectic of world historical reason. The idea is that if the intellect pursues its work thoroughly and consistently enough then it turns into reason automatically breaking down one-sidedness by developing it to its limits.
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‘The English could be called the people of intellectual intuition. They recognize the rational less in the form of universality than in that of individuality. Thus their poets rank far higher than their philosophers. Originality of personality is a very prominent feature with the English. But their originality is not naive and natural, but stems from thought, from the will. In this the individual wills to be self-dependent in every respect, to relate to the universal only by way of his idiosyncracy. For this reason, political freedom with the English mainly takes the form of privileges, of rights which are traditional, not derived from universal thoughts. The sending of deputies to Parliament by the individual English municipalities and counties is everywhere based on particular privileges, not on universal principles consistently carried out. Certainly the Englishman is proud of the honour and freedom of his whole nation, but his national pride is founded mainly on the consciousness that in England the individual can retain and exercise his particularity. Associated with this tenacity of individuality, which, though pursuing the universal, in its relation with the universal holds fast to itself, is the conspicuous aptitude of the English for trade’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Intellectual intuition (intellektuelle(n) Anschauung) is an expression coined by Immanuel Kant for a type of intuition or grasp of individual entities which is not sensory and dependent on sense-perception but purely intellectual, see §415, 449. Kant supposed that God (if He exists) has intellectual intuition, but we humans have only sensory intuition, and our intellect is general and conceptual, grasping individuals only with the aid of sense-perception. Hegel is less inclined than Kant to deny that we possess intellectual intuition and is therefore not entirely merrily jesting when he ascribes it to the English. It is intellectual since it grasps the rational, and intuition, since it focuses upon individuals rather than universality.
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Lips growing for service Eyes steady for peeling Bring on the special guest A monkey caught stealing Standard rewards in corners Is full-board in new quarters Kneeling for pleasure Ensures a good time
I remember, I remember Making the body search I remember, I remember Making the body search Someone is taking you Someone has taken me TV doesn’t understand A word that matters Scattering desires to Smouldering fires Someone has taken you Someone is taking me
I remember, I remember Making the body search I remember, I remember Making the body search
I remember Making the body search That is was nothing But enough for ahead
I remember Making the body search That is was nothing But enough for ahead
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‘The Germans usually think of the Germans last, either from modesty or because one saves the best till the end. We have the reputation of being profound, though not infrequently obscure, thinkers; we aim at comprehending the innermost nature of things and their necessary connection; therefore, we go extremely systematically to work in science, only in doing so we occasionally lapse into the formalism of an external, arbitrary construction. Our mind, more than that of any other European nation, is in general turned inwards. We prefer to live in the inwardness of emotion and of thinking. In this still life, in this hermit-like solitude of spirit, we first busy ourselves before we act with carefully determining the principles on which we propose to act. That is why we are somewhat slow in proceeding to action, occasionally, in cases which demand a quick decision, remain undecided and with the sincere wish to do the thing really well, often fail to achieve anything at all. The French proverb, le meilleur tue le bien, can therefore rightly be applied to the Germans. Everything that is supposed to be done must, with the Germans, be justified by grounds. But since grounds can be found for everything, this justification often becomes mere formalism, in which the universal thought of right does not reach its immanent development but remains an abstraction into which the particular arbitrarily intrudes from outside’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
The Germans like to define the principles (Grundsätze) on which they act, and also to find grounds or reasons (Gründe) for what they do. The first procedure means that often the better kills the good, that is the search for perfection leads them to act in a worse way than they otherwise would have done. The second means that, since reasons (though not conclusive reasons) can be found for anything, in practice such principles and reasons do not genuinely determine what they do, but rely on external input. For example, some invoke a principle such as the sanctity of human life in order to oppose the death penalty for murder. Others invoke the same principle in order to support the death penalty, arguing that the principle requires us to deter or punish the unlawful killing of a human being very severely. In reality the principle is a reason for either view, but a conclusive reason for neither. Thus it can be used to support whichever alternative one favours on other grounds. Hegel implies that the immanent development of the ‘universal thought of right will solve some of these dilemmas, but he does not believe that every decision that we have to make (for instance on precise rates of taxation) can be determined in this way, see. §529. Formalism here refers not to abstract principles or reasons, but to formal rights that confer no real benefit on the right-holder. Hegel may be thinking of the Holy Roman Empire, which until Napoleon abolished it in 1806, formed a loose framework of German unity: the emperor was elected by the seven electoral princes of Germany, though for centuries the emperor had been supplied by Austria.
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Flowers must die I see when I come back From my lysergic daydream Standing in the middle Of the glass and neon forest With an unhappy name: CityFlowers must die And I feel that I die too With a dusty flower I feel like an ill child From the universe A lost God in the dust of the City Flowers must die After the great asphalt kiss One of the fathers of my horror Making money, unliving theatre I’m not machine-addict I like the people around me Without open soul in the City Flowers must diе The lost children of colour The diamonds of my trip And whеn they are gone I want to be a stone Not living, not thinking A thing without warm blood in the City
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§395
(3) The soul is differentiated into the individual subject. But this subjectivity comes into consideration here only as an individualization of natural determinacy. This determinacy becomes the mode of the varying temperament, talent, character, physiognomy, and other dispositions and idiosyncrasies, in families or in single individuals.
Zusatz. As we have seen, the natural mind first divides up into the universal differences of the races of mankind, and reaches, in the minds of peoples, a difference that has the form of particularization. The third stage is that the natural mind proceeds to its individualization, and as individual soul opposes itself to itself. But the opposition arising here is not yet the opposition which belongs to the essence of consciousness. Here in anthropology the singularity or individuality of the soul comes into account only as a natural determinacy.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
The natural mind opposes itself to itself as individual soul in that one individual soul differs by nature from another in temperament, etc. This opposition is quite different from the opposition between consciousness and its object, which is no longer a matter of nature.
‘Now first of all we must remark that it is in the individual soul that the sphere of the contingent begins, for only the universal is the necessary. Individual souls are distinguished from each other by an infinite number of contingent modifications. But this infinity belongs to the bad kind of infinite. One should not therefore rate the peculiarity of people too highly. On the contrary, the assertion that the teacher should carefully adjust himself to the individuality of each of his pupils, studying and developing it, must be proclaimed to be a piece of idle prattle that leads up the garden path. The teacher has simply no time for this. The peculiarity of children is tolerated within the family circle; but at school begins a life subject to universal regulations, to a rule common to all; at school the mind must be induced to lay aside its idiosyncrasies, to know and to will the universal, to accept the current universal culture. This reshaping of the soul, this alone is what education means. The more cultivated a man is, the less his behaviour exhibits anything peculiar only to him, anything therefore contingent’
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Bad infinity is distinguished from good or true infinity. The bad infinite goes on for ever and it is also, in some cases, sharply distinct from the finite, the true infinite forms a circle and embraces the finite, see ‘Encyclopaedia Logic’ §94–5. The claim that individual idiosyncracy is a matter of bad infinity implies that it is of secondary importance, Hegel is arguing against educational views inspired especially ‘Emile, or On Education’ by Jean-Jacques Rousseau which emphasized the natural development of a child’s abilities, ‘Philosophy of Right’, §153. Two distinct claims are made. First, the aim of education is not to cultivate the child’s idiosyncracies but to induct it into the general or universal culture. Second, in educating children one should not begin from their idiosyncracies, adapting the teaching to them, but teach them in a uniform way. The first is reasonable enough but as for the second one could argue that the best way of leading children to a uniform end-point is to adapt one’s teaching to their different starting-points. But there is no time, for the first claim is that education tends to eliminate eccentricity, not that everyone is to be educated to exactly the same level or that no one should learn special skills. But the ability to lecture on philosophy of mind or to make violins are aspects of the general culture shared by a class albeit a small class and not simply individual peculiarities.
‘By predisposition is understood the natural aptitudes of a man in contrast to what he has become by his own activity. These aptitudes include talent and genius. Both words express a definite direction which the individual mind has been given by nature. Genius, however, is wider in scope than talent; talent produces novelty only in the province of the particular, whereas genius creates a new genre. But since talent and genius are initially mere aptitudes, they must be developed-if they are not to go to waste, to decay, to degenerate into bad originality-by universally valid procedures. Only by such development do these aptitudes demonstrate their presence, their power and their range. Before such development one can be deceived about the reality of a talent; an early occupation with painting, for example, may seem to betray talent for this art and yet this hobby may come to nothing. Mere talent is, therefore, not to be valued more highly than reason which by its own activity has come to knowledge of its concept,-than absolutely free thinking and willing. In philosophy, mere genius does not get one very far; here it must submit to the strict discipline of logical thinking; it is only by this submission that genius there achieves its complete freedom’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Predisposition translates Naturell, a seventeenth-century borrowing from the French naturel, a nominalized adjective meaning natural predisposition, natural character, disposition, temperament. Talent or genius is not a sufficient condition of success in for instance painting or philosophy. Nor is talent or genius a necessary condition for success, at least in philosophy, someone who lacks any special gift can achieve results by strenuous and systematic reasoning, while a genius who does not submit to the discipline of logical thinking will not get far. Logical thinking does not require talent or genius, thought is a function of the mind at its highest level and involves the natural mind only minimally and in philosophical thinking the mind soars above the natural constraints of talent, genius, and their absence, into a realm of freedom. Pure thought is autonomous and self-developing hence once one has started to think, thought as it were takes one over and there is no reason why one should not think to the highest level, as long as one puts in the effort to think properly and not be distracted by other things. The capacity for thought, reason, is present in every human being so every human being is after a suitable education able to think to the highest level, more slowly perhaps than a gifted person but just as surely.
‘As regards the will, however, one cannot say that there is a genius for virtue; for virtue is something universal, to be required of all men and nothing innate but something to be produced in the individual by his own activity. Differences in predisposition have, therefore, no importance whatever for the theory of virtue; they would come into consideration, if we may so express ourselves, only in a natural history of mind’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Hegel already spoke of ‘reason which by its own activity has come to a knowledge of its concept’ as ‘absolutely free thinking and willing’ and he dealt with ‘thinking’ under the heading of ‘philosophy’, as for ‘willing’ two reasons are given for denying a ‘genius for virtue’, that virtue is required of everyone and that virtue is not innate but acquired by one’s own efforts. It might be objected that the virtue required of all is a fairly humble affair, but that genius may be required for the performance of supererogatory acts, such as those performed by saints and heroes. Hegel might reply that the respect we accord to saints and heroes implies that they achieved this status by their own efforts, not by a natural gift. Here too, he is influenced by his belief that the rational will, in contrast to everyday likes and dislikes, belongs to the higher reaches of the mind that have broken loose from natural constraints and must therefore be free.
‘It is difficult to say what is meant by temperament. Temperament does not relate to the ethical nature of action, nor to the talent revealed in the action, nor finally to passion, which always has a determinate content. It is therefore best to define temperament as the entirely universal mode and manner in which the individual is active, objectifies himself, maintains himself in actuality. From this definition it emerges that for the free mind, temperament is not so important as was formerly supposed. In a time of greater cultivation, the various contingent mannerisms of conduct and action disappear, and with them the varieties of temperament, in just the same way that, in such a time, the restricted characters in comedies of a less cultivated epoch-the completely frivolous, the ridiculously absentminded, the stingy misers-become much rarer. The attempts to distinguish between temperaments involve such indeterminacy that one hardly knows how to apply them to individuals, since the temperaments portrayed separately are, in individuals, found more or less combined with each other. Just as virtue was distinguished into four cardinal virtues, so too, as we know, four temperaments were assumed: the choleric, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, and the melancholic. Kant has a great deal to say about them. The main difference between these temperaments is based on whether someone devotes himself to the matter in hand or whether he is more concerned with his own individuality. The former case occurs with the sanguine and phlegmatic, the latter with the choleric and melancholic. The sanguine individual forgets himself in what he is doing, and more specifically in such way that by virtue of his superficial versatility, he gets involved in a variety of concerns; the phlegmatic individual, on the contrary, steadfastly applies himself to one concern. But in the choleric and the melancholic, as we have already indicated, close attachment to subjectivity is predominant; however, these two temperaments are in turn distinguished from each other by the fact that in the choleric, versatility predominates, and in the melancholic, inertia; so that in this connection the choleric temperament corresponds to the sanguine and the melancholic to the phlegmatic’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
The account of temperament reminds us of Martin Heidegger’s, (1889–1976), account of Befindlichkeit, how one finds oneself , and of mood:
‘A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being. But with the negative distinction between state-of-mind and the reflective apprehending of something ‘within’, we have thus reached a positive insight into their character as disclosure. The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something. Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on Things and persons. It is in this that the second essential characteristic of states-of-mind shows itself’.
- ‘Being and Time’
The mood overwhelms coming neither from without nor from within but arises as a mode of Being-in-the-world from Being-in-the-world itself, and Hegel speaks of temperamental moods or maybe attunements of temperament (Temperamentstimmungen), and yet he downgrades temperament, mood, and everything that Heidegger associates with Geworfenheit, thrownness, demoting them to the natural mind that culture overcomes, see §392 and 401. The word temperament comes from the Latin temperare, to combine, blend, keep in due proportion, and temperamentum, a mixing in due proportion, a due measure. It was then used especially for the proportion in which the four human bodily fluids or humours are mixed and this in turn corresponds to the mixture of four elements, hot, cold, dry, wet. For instance, a choleric temperament depends on a preponderance of heat and dryness, the blood is overwhelmed by bile, overheated, and burnt and this medieval theory goes back to the Greek physician Hippocrates. Kant dealt with the temperaments in ‘Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View’, 1798.
‘We have already remarked that difference of temperament loses its importance in a period when the mode and manner of conduct and of the activity of individuals is established by the universal culture. Character, on the other hand, remains something which always differentiates people. Only by character does the individual attain his stable determinacy. Character requires, firstly, a formal element, the energy with which a man, without letting himself be diverted, pursues his aims and interests and in all his actions preserves his harmony with himself. Without character a man does not emerge from his indeterminacy or he slides from one direction to the opposite. Every human being should therefore be required to show character. A man with character impresses others because they know the kind of man they are dealing with. But besides formal energy character requires, secondly, a substantial, universal content of the will. Only by carrying out great aims does a man reveal a great character, making him a beacon for others; and his aims must be inwardly justified if his character is to exhibit the absolute unity of the content and the formal activity of the will and thus to have complete truth. If, on the contrary, the will clings to mere details, to the insubstantial, then it becomes obstinacy. Obstinacy has only the form, not the content, of character. Through obstinacy, this parody of character, the individuality of a man is accentuated to a point where it spoils companionship with others’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Charakter, like character, oscillates between something that every adult human being has even if it is a weak, vacillating character, and something that only strong, distinctive, consistent people have, while some people are lacking in character. Hegel focusses upon the latter. Unlike temperament which can be overcome by culture character is indispensable, strength of character enables us to pursue the ends that our culture requires of us or presents to us as possibilities. Character requires, first, energy and consistency and need not exclude the trimmer who like George Savile, Marquess of Halifax (1633–1695) supports what is for the moment the weaker party so as to avoid either side gaining the preponderance.
[Note on trimmers: ‘This innocent word Trimmer’, explained Halifax, ‘signifieth no more than this, that if men are together in a boat, and one part of the company would weigh it down on one side, another would make it lean as much to the contrary’. There are, he continues, ‘those, who conceive it would do as well, if the boat went even, without endangering the passengers.’ The trimmer disposes his weight wherever it is needed to balance those who would ‘bungle’, ‘mangle’, or ‘disguise’ the laws of their country, whatever their particular reasons for seeking to do so and he opposes those who have a ‘lust’ for ‘suffering from a wrong point of honour’, and those who ‘raise angry apparitions to keep men from being reconciled’, and he will expose the view that the ‘opinion most in the right’ is that ‘which produceth the greatest number of those who are willing to suffer for it’. The majority of British Academics, alas, at least in the humanities and politically and social sciences, are nowadays left-leaning (scornful of Brexit, Trump etc). What is needed is a few trimmers, like me. A trimmer is one that dwells ‘in the middle between the two extremes’ and so for Halifax, the English climate, English laws, the Church, God Himself are trimmers. ‘In such company’, he wrote, ‘our Trimmer is not ashamed of his name’, and he ‘will not be bawled, threatened, laughed or drunk out of’ his principles of moderation even if he is attacked as a heretic for maintaining them.]
But character excludes vacillation that has no respectable universal aim resulting only from overriding concern for one’s own safety or inability to make up one’s mind. And further, character requires that one’s guiding aims have a universal content and be inwardly justified if it is to have complete truth and this excludes the pursuit of a trivial enterprise such as the man who devotes himself single-mindedly to throwing lentils through the eye of a needle:
‘… we soon get tired of a man who can imitate to perfection the warbling of the nightingale (and there are such men); as soon as it is discovered that it is a man who is producing the notes, we are at once weary of the song. We then recognize in it nothing but a trick, neither the free production of nature, nor a work of art, since from the free productive power of man we expect something quite different from such music which interests us only when, as is the case with the nightingale’s warbling, it gushes forth purposeless from the bird’s own life, like the voice of human feeling. In general this delight in imitative skill can always be but restricted, and it befits man better to take delight in what he produces out of himself. In this sense the discovery of any insignificant technical product has higher value, and man can be prouder of having invented the hammer, the nail, etc., than of manufacturing tricks of imitation. For this enthusiasm for copying merely as copying is to be respected as little as the trick of the man who had learnt to throw lentils through a small opening without missing. He displayed this dexterity before Alexander, but Alexander gave him a bushel of lentils as a reward for this useless and worthless art’.
- ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’
The enterprise also needs some respectable justification. This does not exclude the devotee of a controversial cause, such as the consistent revolutionary, the consistent restorationist, or the consistent trimmer. The cause need only have some general justification, not a conclusive and overriding justification. Complete truth means the harmony of the will’s form and content, not the manifest correctness of the content to the exclusion of all other contents. The form of the lentil thrower’s will, his energy, is at odds with the triviality of its content. Hence he displays self-will or obstinacy (Eigensinn), not character.
Weak characters are often favoured by Romantic art:
‘Hamlet’s nature is weak in practice ; his beautiful heart is indrawn; it is hard for him to decide to escape from this inner harmony; he is melancholy, meditative, hypochondriacal, and pensive, therefore with no inclination for a rash act. After all, Goethe clung to the idea that what Shakespeare wished to sketch was a great deed imposed on a soul that had not grown enough for its execution. And he finds the whole piece worked out in accordance with this interpretation: ‘Here is an oak tree,’ he says, ‘planted in a costly jar which should only have had lovely flowers blooming in it; the roots expand ; the jar is destroyed’.
The Goethe quote is from ‘Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre’.
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Si Monsieur Shakespeare m’avait connuIl n’aurait jamais eu l’idée de déclarer ainsi” To be or not to be “Être ou ne pas êtreN’est vraiment pas ma raison d’êtreElle se résume à ceci :Ne pas s’en faire dans la vie Moi j’ai mes problèmes, Monsieur Shakespeare avait les siens Et mon seul souci est de savoir ce que sera demain Et manger, et dormir, comment pourrais-je m’en sortir ? Ah si je pouvais lire dans l’avenir Si Monsieur Shakespeare m’avait connuIl n’aurait jamais eu l’idée de déclarer ainsi” To be or not to be “Les temps ont changéAinsi que la moralité Qui nous dit que dans cents ans Il n’y a plus de savantsJe suis philosophe, oui je m’en porte très bien Et je laisse à d’autres les complexes de l’esprit humain Un baiser, un sourire sont mes deux raisons de vivre Et ce sont mes plus beaux souvenirs Si Monsieur Shakespeare m’avait connuIl n’aurait jamais eu l’idée de déclarer ainsi” To be or not to be “Être ou ne pas êtreN’est vraiment pas ma raison d’être Elle se résume à ceci :Ne pas s’en faire dans la vie To be or not to be That’s the question…
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‘Of a still more individual kind are the so-called idiosyncrasies, which occur both in the physical and in the mental nature of man. Some people, for example, scent the presence of cats near them. Others are quite peculiarly affected by certain diseases. King James I of England fainted if he saw a rapier. Mental idiosyncrasies are displayed especially in youth, e.g. in the incredible rapidity of mental arithmetic in particular children. Incidentally, it is not merely individuals who are distinguished from each other by the forms of mind’s natural determinacy discussed above, but to some extent families too, especially when they have intermarried among themselves and not with outsiders, as has been the case, for example, in Bern and in quite a few of the free German cities’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Idiosynkrasien, not as important to him as the other three categories and do not feature in what follows.
The triad predisposition, temperament, character is rationally necessary, since predisposition is opposed to temperament, and character overcomes the opposition by combining features of both. A predisposition is, first, immediately fixed with the form of something that merely is (eines bloss Seienden), that is, just there, not produced or altered by us, and, secondly, its ‘inner differentiation is related to an external difference. That is, talent is always talent for something, a talent for painting differs from a talent for music by reference to the difference between painting and music; genius is not for something specific, but it manifests itself in one’s actions and products. Temperaments, by contrast, are not fixed, but flow into each other, and differentiated by reflection within, not externally. In each of these dimensions character resembles both predisposition and temperament. First, it is fixed (like predisposition), but also changeable (like temperament). That is, its fixity depends not on nature but on the will. If character were no more than an ‘even blending of the various temperaments’, it would be natural and not need development by the will. Secondly, it refers outwards (like predisposition), but the soul is reflected into itself (as in temperament). That is, one’s character essentially affects how one behaves, but also involves an inner power, strength of will, that a talent as such need not involve. Predisposition too needs to be developed by the will to manifest itself, but it exists whether or not it is developed, whereas character exists only if it is developed. One may have an undeveloped talent for painting, but not an undeveloped strong character. The products of talent or genius manifest not simply the talent or genius, but the strength of character to develop and exercise it.
‘The fixity of character is not so immediate, not so innate, as the fixity of predisposition, but has to be developed by the will. Character consists in something more than an even blending of the various temperaments. All the same, it cannot be denied that it has a natural foundation, that some people are more naturally prone to a strong character than others. For this reason, we had the right to speak of character here in Anthropology, although it is only in the sphere of free mind that it obtains its full unfolding’.
- ‘Philosophy of Mind’
For my lovely One with a big heart and personality … ❤️
Over and over I tried to prove my love to you Over and over What more can I do Over and over My friends say I’m a fool But over and over I’ll be a fool for you
’cause you got personality Walk, with personality Talk, with personality Smile, with personality Charm, with personality Love, with personality And of Cause you’ve got A great big heart
So over and over (over and over) Oh, I’ll be a fool to you (over and over) Now over and over (over and over) What more can I do (over and over)
’cause you got personality Walk, with personality Talk, with personality Smile, with personality Charm, with personality Love, with personality And of Cause you’ve got A great big heart
So over and over (over and over) Oh, I’ll be a fool to you (over and over) Now over and over (over and over) What more can I do (over and over)
Over and over I said that I loved you Over and over, honey Now it’s the truth Over and over They still say I’m a fool But over and over I’ll be a fool for you
’cause you got personality Walk, with personality Talk, with personality Smile, with personality Charm, with personality Love, with personality And of Cause you’ve got A great big heart
So over and over (over and over) Oh, I’ll be a fool to you (over and over) Now over and over (over and over) What more can I do!
—
Coming up next:
Natural alterations.
It may stop but it never ends.
