On Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic’ : A Realm of Shadows — part fifty seven.

David Proud
21 min readApr 30, 2023

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‘On Teleology’

by Heinrich Heine (1797–1856)

God gave us legs and gave us two

So we’d be good at shooting through

Picture what would be our lot

- our personhood fixed to one spot

To be a station-ary chump

All we’d need would be a stump.

God gave us a pair of eyes

To see the world both clear and wise

To take on faith all that we read

A single eye’d be all we’d need

God gave us eyes that numbered two

So we’d be happy checking out

All He created round about

To suit the human point of view.

When checking out life on the street

The wise man with both eyes discerns

The chances uncouth folk we meet

Will tread upon our aching corns

Which have caused us painful passion

Since pointy shoes have been in fashion.

God gave us a pair of hands

To do double good throughout all lands

Not so we’d be doubly grasping

Precious metal ‘ever heaping

Into chests and cupboards too

As certain folk are wont to do

(We could give their names as well

Yet that’s what we dare not tell

Yes, we’d gladly see them hung

Yet it’s from them art’s funding’s wrung,

From these great men, the philanthropes,

The source of our financial hopes.

A German oak’s no tree from which

To fashion gallows for the rich.)

God thought with one nose we’d be right

Because with two we’d have to fight

To get a wine glass near mouth or head

We’d have to snort our wine instead.

God made one mouth the routine

Because two mouths would be unclean

With one mouth the son of earth

Still babbles ceaselessly from birth

With double mouth and double craw

He’d eat and lie a whole lot more

Now when he’s munching on a pastie

He stays beneficially mute

With two mouths things would get nasty

He’d munch while uttering lies to boot.

With two ears we are endowed

By the Lord who thus avowed

His great belief in symmetry

Nor are ours as large as He

Gave our good grey plodding friends

The donkeys with their wide rear ends.

He gave us both ears ’cause He knew

That Mozart, Gluck and Haydn too

In stereo sound right and true.

If nothing topped the maudlin tone

That sounds from the haemorrhoidal zone

Of the ass-like Meyerbeer

All we’d need would be one ear!

Having wound up thus my speech

To my refined Teutonic blonde

She gave a sigh and did respond

Really, Heinrich, how you squelch

Meaning from th’ Creator’s deeds

As if a lumpen loaf of bread

Could guess thoughts in a baker’s head.

And yet man asks forever why

When he sees things gone awry.

My friend, I heard you state your thesis,

Your admirable exegesis

Of how the Lord with good intent

We human beings from heaven sent

Two ears, two legs, two eyes to roll

While giving us not more than a sole

Exemplar of mouth and nose

But tell me — how could He propose

- Lord God, Creator of All Nature -

To give His favourite two-legged creature

That single scabrous dangling prop

With which a male can never stop

Trying to pass on wretched genes

Or — relieving himself by similar means.

My friend, why not here duplicate

Where duplication’s what we need

To cover functions which indeed

Are most vital for the state

As for folk of every sort -

For all society, in short.

These two functions do contrast

In a way that’s unsurpassed,

Condemnable and largely base -

They frankly shame the human race.

Think of a girl of lively feeling,

Dead for shame and mentally reeling,

When she finds her male ideal

Equipped with something so surreal,

When he who’s set her heart aflutter

Turns out to worship in the gutter.

Psyche shudders when Amor,

The little angel, shy of light,

The morning after in the raw

Turns all her girlish dreams — to shite.

My graceful Hun had said her last

But I said, sweetheart, not so fast,

You of feminine persuasion

Haven’t any thought to spare

For one whole side of the equation

God solved with economic flair:

- how the gadgetry he made

Could serve needs grand and quite clichéd,

- how mothers’ cares and profane lusts

Could both be served by well-formed busts. . .

Simplicity’s itself refined

When every part is well combined,

When what we use when on the can

Assists with the ascent of man,

When on the self-same bagpipes play

The self-same yokels, glum and gay,

When paws and claws both fine and brute

Can strum upon the self-same lute,

When through the self-same vapours, rivets

Each man sings and yawns and pivots:

When one bus does just as well

To transport both of us to Hell.

— -

‘Zur Teleologie’

Beine hat uns zwei gegeben

Gott der Herr, um fortzustreben,

Wollte nicht, dass an der Scholle

Unsre Menschheit kleben solle.

Um ein Stillstandsknecht zu sein

Gnuegte uns ein einzges Bein.

Augen gab uns Gott ein Paar,

Dass wir schauen rein und klar;

Um zu glauben was wir lesen,

Waer ein Auge gnug gewesen.

Gott gab uns die Augen beide,

Dass wir schauen and begaffen

Wie er huebsch die Welt erschaffen

Zu des Menschen Augenweide;

Doch beim Gaffen in den Gassen

Sollen wir die Augen brauchen

Und uns dort nicht treten lassen

Auf die armen Huehneraugen,

Die uns ganz besonders plagen,

Wenn wir enge Stiefel tragen.

Nicht um doppelt zuzugreifen

Um die Beute aufzuhaeufen

In den grossen Eisentruhn,

Wie gewisse Leute tun -

(Ihren Namen auszusprechen

Duerfen wir uns incht erfrechen -

Haengen wuerden wir sie gern.

Doch sie sind so grosse Herrn,

Philanthropen, Ehrenmaenner,

Manche sind auch unsre Goenner,

Und man macht aus deutschen Eichen

Keine Galgen fuer die Reichen.)

Gott gab uns nur einen Mund,

Weil zwei Maueler ungesund.

Mit dem einen Maule schon

Schwaetzt zu viel der Erdensohn.

Wenn er doppeltmaeulig waer,

Fraess und loeg er auch noch mehr.

Hat er jetzt das Maul voll Brei,

Muss er schweigen unterdessen,

Haett er aber Maeuler zwei,

Loege er sogar beim Fressen.

Mit zwei Ohren hat versehn

Uns der Herr. Vorzueglich schoen

Ist dabei die Symmetrie.

Sind nicht ganz so lang wie die,

So er unsern grauen braven

Kameraden anerschaffen.

Ohren gab uns Gott die beiden,

Um von Mozart, Gluck und Haydn

Meisterstuecke anzuhoeren -

Gab es nur Tonkunst-Kolik

Und Haemorrhoidal-Musik

Von dem grossen Meyerbeer,

Schon ein Ohr hinlaenglich waer! -

Als zur blonden Teutolinde

Ich in solcher Weise sprach,

Seufzte sie und sagte: Ach!

Gruebeln ueber Gottes Gruende,

Kritisieren unsern Schoepfer,

Ach! das ist, als ob der Topf

Klueger sein wollt als der Toepfer!

Doch der Mensch fragt stets: Warum?

Wenn er sieht, dass etwas dumm.

Freund, ich hab dir zugehoert,

Und du hast mir gut erklaert,

Wie zum weisesten Behuf

Gott den Menschen zwiefach schuf

Augen, Ohren, Arm’ und Bein,

Waehrend er ihm gab nur ein

Exemplar von Nas und Mund -

Doch nun sage mir den Grund:

Gott, der Schoepher der Natur,

Warum schuf er einfach nur

Das skabroese Requisit,

Das der Mann gebraucht, damit

Er fortpflanze seine Rasse

Und zugleich sein Wasser lasse?

Teurer Freund, ein Duplikat

Waere wahrlich hier vonnoeten,

Um Funktionen zu vertreten,

Die so wichtig fuer den Staat

Wie fuers Individuum,

Kurz fuers ganze Publikum.

Zwei Funktionen, die so greulich

Und so schimpflich und abscheulich

Miteinander konstrastieren

Und die Menschheit sehr blamieren.

Eine Jungfrau von Gemuet

Muss sich schaemen, wenn sie sieht,

Wie ihr hoechstes Ideal

Wird entweiht so trivial!

Wie der Hochaltar der Minne

Wird zur ganz gemeinen Rinne!

Psyche schaudert, denn der kleine

Gott Amur der Finsternis,

Er verwandelt sich beim Scheine

Ihrer Lamp — in Mankepiss.

Also Teutolinde sprach,

Und ich sagte ihr: Gemach!

Unklug wie die Weiber sind,

Du verstehst nicht, liebes Kind,

Gottes Nuetzlichkeitssystem,

Sein Oekonomie-Problem

Ist, dass wechselnd die Maschinen

Jeglichem Beduerfnis dienen,

Den profanen wie den heilgen,

Den pikanten wie langweilgen, -

Alles wird simplifiziert;

Klug ist alles kombiniert:

Was dem Menschen dient zum Seichen,

Damit schafft er seinesgleichen.

Auf demselben Dudelsack

Spielt dasselbe Lumpenpack.

Feine Pfote, derbe Patsche,

Fiddelt auf derselben Bratsche,

Durch dieselben Daempfe, Raeder

Springt und singt und gaehnt ein jeder,

Und derselbe Omnibus

Faehrt uns nach dem Tartarus.

‘Psyche’.

In her hand the little lamp, and

Mighty passion in her breast,

Psyche creepeth to the couch where

Her dear sleeper takes his rest.

How she blushes, how she trembles,

When his beauty she descries!

He, the God of love, unveil’d thus,

Soon awakes and quickly flies.

Eighteen hundred years’ repentance!

And the poor thing nearly died!

Psyche fasts and whips herself still,

For she Amor naked spied.

‘Psyche’

In der Hand die kleine Lampe,

In der Brust die große Gluth,

Schleichet Psyche zu dem Lager

Wo der holde Schläfer ruht.

Sie erröthet und sie zittert

Wie sie seine Schönheit sieht –

Der enthüllte Gott der Liebe,

Er erwacht und er entflieht.

Achtzehnhundertjähr’ge Buße!

Und die Aermste stirbt beinah!

Psyche fastet und kasteyt sich,

Weil sie Amorn nackend sah.

Heine combines two allusions in this poem: first, the story of Psyche and Cupid, where Psyche marries Cupid without knowing who he is, and receives him only in the dark of night, forbidden to see him. When she disobeys and lights her lamp, he flies away. However, Heine’s Cupid at this point is transformed into the famous Flemish statue of a young boy urinating, called Manneken Pis.

Arrestatie van Manneken Pis, 1845, Souvenir de Bruxelles. Arrestation du plus ancien bourgeois de Bruxelles. Pour contravention à l’Ordonnance de Police sur les Pissoirs de l’année 1845. (Arrest of the oldest bourgeois of Brussels. For violation of the Police Ordinance on the Pissoirs of the year 1845).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770–1831). ‘The Science of Logic’

The Idea of the Good. In Theorem, the Notion was Individual. It apprehended all the mediations — all the possibilities. It was, in Kantian terms, a transcendental unity of apperception. Yet this intelligence is still subjective, facing an objectivity wherein Notion cannot recognize itself. ‘Reality is constituted by mind. At first mind does not realise this. It sees reality as something independent of it, even as something hostile or alien to it’, explains Peter Singer. The Understanding now proposes that Notion must obliterate all given material in which Notion cannot recognize itself. As Hegel explains in the ‘Jena Logic’: ‘The self-preservation of the I is precisely this removing of what is alien from that circle, so that [the circle] remains only the universal’.

Notion must expressly create its own reality. Good consists of constructing ‘an object identical with our concepts’ explains John W. Burbidge. Only then will Notion be truly free. This mad riot of destruction aimed at anything opposing the Notion is what Hegel calls the Good. The Good, or Practical Idea, represents the Notion’s certainty of its own actuality and of the non-actuality of the world.

‘Inasmuch as the concept, which is its own subject matter, is determined in and for itself, the subject is determined as singular. As subjective it again has an implicit otherness for its presupposition; it is the impulse to realize itself, the purpose that on its own wants to give itself objectivity in the objective world and realize itself. In the theoretical idea the subjective concept, as a universal that in and for itself lacks determination, stands opposed to the objective world from which it derives determinate content and filling. But in the practical idea it is as actual that it stands over against the actual; but the certainty of itself that the subject possesses in being determined in and for itself is a certainty of its actuality and of the non-actuality of the world; it is the singularity of this world, and the determinateness of its singularity, not just its otherness as abstract universality, which is a nullity for the subject. The subject has here vindicated objectivity for itself; its inner determinateness is the objective, for it is the universality which is just as much absolutely determined; the previously objective world is on the contrary only something still posited, an immediate which is determined in a multitude of ways but which, because it is only immediately determined, in itself eludes the unity of the concept and is of itself a nullity’.

- ‘The Science of Logic’

The subject manifests its objectivity in smashing idols. The given The Good (Practical idea) materials from which Notion was alienated are now considered a nullity. According to Errol E. Harris, the Good is ‘the unceasing striving to overcome evil, the continuing and unfailing love of one’s neighbour, which … is an established disposition of mind and will and a persistent on-going activity’. This simplistic version such as one may e taught in Sunday School is not Hegel’s point however. Giacomo Rinaldi believes that the true and the good relate to specifically human concerns, not the concerns of spirit. Yet the True is the collapse of Theory; the Good is the obliteration of alienation, very abstract spiritual concerns.

‘All action presupposes a reality ‘alien’ to the doer’ says Herbert Marcuse. It ‘treats the world as an empty receptacle for the actualization of its subjective purposes’. According to the Bible, God created the universe and saw that it was good. But this act of creation is also an act of destruction. The universe is God’s manifestation, but it is also a negation of the chaos that preceded it.

The Good (Practical Idea)

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I was somewhere deep down under the Earth

It was a passageway, stone-flagged, and with stone walls, and I was walking slowly down it in my bare feet

I could feel the chill of the cold stones through the thick layer of dust

The passageway stretched ahead of me endlessly

and suddenly I noticed there were doors set into the walls on either side

closed doors and on each door there was a name

Abel

Abercromby

Abbington

Where was I?

What was this place?

What was behind those awful ominously closed doors?

Something seemed to be drawing me on, on down the terrible passageway …

Institute of Irish Studies, Abercromby Square, University of Liverpool

Practical Idea is precisely this same act of creation. It is what Immanuel Kant, (1724–1804), would call an intellectual intuition, where thought and deed are one. According to Charles Taylor: ‘Hegel reproaches Kant for not having cleaved to the notion of an intellectual intuition, which he himself invented. This would be an understanding, which unlike ours did not have to depend on external reception, on being affected from outside, for its contents, but created them with its thought. This archetypical intellect Kant attributed to God; it was quite beyond us. But God’s intellect is ultimately revealed to us for Hegel, it only lives in our thought. Hence we can participate in an intellectual intuition. God’s thought is ours’. An intellectual intuition amounts to ‘the direct apprehension of things as they are’ said Stanley Rosen. accordingly, the Good “comes upon the scene with the worth of being absolute, because it is within itself the totality of the Notion, the subjective that is at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity.

‘This determinateness which is in the concept, is equal to the concept, and entails a demand for singular external actuality, is the good. It comes on the scene with the dignity of being absolute, because it is intrinsically the totality of the concept, the objective which is at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity. This idea is superior to the idea of cognition just considered, for it has not only the value of the universal but also of the absolutely actual. — It is impulse, in so far as this actual is still subjective, self-positing, without at the same time the form of immediate presupposition; its impulse to realize itself is not, strictly speaking, to give itself objectivity, for this it possesses within itself, but to give itself only this empty form of immediacy. — The activity of purpose, therefore, is not directed at itself, is not a matter of letting in a given determination and making it its own, but of positing rather its own determination and, by means of sublating the determinations of the external world, giving itself reality in the form of external actuality. — The idea of the will as a self-determining explicitly possesses content within itself. Now this content is indeed a determinate content, and to this extent finite and restricted; self-determination is essentially particularization, since the reflection of the will is in itself, as negative unity as such, also singularity in the sense that it excludes an other while presupposing it. Yet the particularity of the content is at first infinite by virtue of the form of the concept, of which it is the proper determinateness, and which in that content possesses its negative self-identity, and consequently not only a particularity but its infinite singularity. The mentioned finitude of the content in the practical idea only means, therefore, that the idea is at first not yet realized; the concept is for the content that which exists in and for itself; it is here the idea in the form of objectivity existing for itself; on the one hand, the subjective is for this reason no longer just something posited, arbitrary or accidental, but is an absolute; but, on the other hand, this form of concrete existence, this being-for-itself, does not as yet have the form of the being-in-itself. Thus what from the side of the form as such appears as opposition, appears in the form of the concept reflected into simple identity, that is, appears in the content as its simple determinateness; the good, although valid in and for itself, is thereby a certain particular purpose, but not one that first receives its truth by being realized; on the contrary, it is for itself already the true’.

- ‘The Science of Logic’

In other words, the Good is ‘action that is also a form of knowing’ says Herbert Marcuse. The Good is objectivity that is conformable to the Notion as noted previously with the life process:

‘This process begins with need, that is, the twofold moment of self-determination of the living being by which the latter posits itself as negated and thereby refers itself to an other than it, to the indifferent objectivity, but in this self-loss it is equally not lost, preserves itself in it and remains the identity of the self-equal concept. The living being is thereby the impulse to posit as its own this world which is other than it, to posit itself as equal to it, to sublate the world and objectify itself. Its self-determination has therefore the form of objective externality, and since it is at the same time self-identical, it is the absolute contradiction. The immediate shape of the living being is the idea in its simple concept, the objectivity conforming to the concept; as such the shape is good by nature. But since its negative moment realizes itself as an objective particularity, that is, since the essential moments of its unity are each realized as a totality for itself, the concept splits into two, becoming an absolute inequality with itself; and since even in this rupture the concept remains absolute identity, the living being is for itself this rupture, has the feeling of this contradiction which is pain. Pain is therefore the prerogative of living natures; since they are the concretely existing concept, they are an actuality of infinite power, so that they are in themselves the negativity of themselves, that this their negativity exists for them, that in their otherness they preserve themselves. — It is said that contradiction cannot be thought; but in the pain of the living being it is even an actual, concrete existence’.

- ‘The Science of Logic’

Yet it is defective. It is actualized but still a subjectivity. Furthermore, its actuality is an otherness. This is a determinate content and to that extent [it is] something finite and limited: Being finite, the various goods brought forth by the Notion must pass away. The Notion is caught in the bad infinity of producing goods that cannot sustain themselves. Dialectical Reason points out that, if the Good is the act of obliterating obstacles to freedom, so that the Idea can be actualized, then the intellectual intuition of Notion must itself be this Good, which must itself obliterate its obstacles. The product of the Good has no staying power unless what it produces is also the Good — just as much a progenitor of Goods as Practical Idea is. When the Notion produces Good that conflicts with the subjective goods of the Notion, the Good finds that it faces obstacles. Hence, the Good of the second individual is Evil for the first.

Evil

‘Psyche’

by Heinrich Heine (1797–1856)

In her hand the little lamp, and

Mighty passion in her breast,

Psyche creepeth to the couch where

Her dear sleeper takes his rest.

How she blushes, how she trembles,

When his beauty she descries!

He, the God of love, unveil’d thus,

Soon awakes and quickly flies.

Eighteen hundred years’ repentance!

And the poor thing nearly died!

Psyche fasts and whips herself still,

For she Amor naked spied.

‘Psyche’

In der Hand die kleine Lampe,

In der Brust die große Gluth,

Schleichet Psyche zu dem Lager

Wo der holde Schläfer ruht.

Sie erröthet und sie zittert

Wie sie seine Schönheit sieht –

Der enthüllte Gott der Liebe,

Er erwacht und er entflieht.

Achtzehnhundertjähr’ge Buße!

Und die Aermste stirbt beinah!

Psyche fastet und kasteyt sich,

Weil sie Amorn nackend sah.

‘Mercury escorting Psyche to Olympus’, 1660s, Peter Paul Rubens

The good remains an ought-to-be.

‘The syllogism of immediate realization does not itself require closer position here; it is none other than the previously considered syllogism of external purposiveness; only the content constitutes the difference. In external as in formal purposiveness it was an indeterminate finite content in general; here, though also finite, it is as such at the same time absolutely valid. But in regard to the conclusion, the realized purpose, a further difference enters in. In being realized the finite purpose still attains only the status of a means; since it is not a purpose determined in and for itself already from the beginning, as realized it also remains something that does not exist in and for itself. If the good is again also fixed as something finite, and is essentially such, then, notwithstanding its inner infinity, it too cannot escape the fate of finitude — a fate that manifests itself in several forms. The realized good is good by virtue of what it already is in the subjective purpose, in its idea; the realization gives it an external existence, but since this existence has only the status of an externality which is in and for itself null, what is good in it has attained only an accidental, fragile existence, not a realization corresponding to the idea. — Further, since this good is restricted in content, there are several kinds of it; in concrete existence a good is subject to destruction not only due to external contingency and to evil, but also because of collision and conflict in the good itself. From the side of the objective world presupposed for it (in the presupposition of which consists the subjectivity and the finitude of the good, and which as a distinct world runs its own course), the realization itself of the good is exposed to obstacles, indeed, might even be made impossible. The good thus remains an ought; it exists in and for itself, but being, as the ultimate abstract immediacy, remains over against it also determined as a non-being. The idea of the fulfilled good is indeed an absolute postulate, but no more than a postulate, that is, the absolute encumbered with the determinateness of subjectivity. There still are two worlds in opposition, one a realm of subjectivity in the pure spaces of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality, an impervious realm of darkness. The complete development of this unresolved contradiction, between that absolute purpose and the restriction of this reality that stands opposed to it, has been examined in detail in the Phenomenology of Spirit (pp. 323ff.).70 — Inasmuch as the idea has within it the moment of complete determinateness, the other concept to which the concept in it relates possesses in its subjectivity at the same time the moment of an object; consequently the idea enters here into the shape of self-consciousness, and in this one respect coincides with its exposition’.

- ‘The Science of Logic’

It aims at freedom but produces only more obstacles. At this late stage, then, Practical Idea faces a topsy-turvy world in which the Good of one is Evil to the other: There are still two worlds in opposition, one a realm of subjectivity in the pure regions of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality that is an undisclosed realm of darkness.

Two Ideas now face each other. Yet we also know that these two Ideas are implicitly the same Idea. Accordingly, in naming the other Idea Evil, the Good proclaims itself evil. And, if Evil is that which impedes the Good, the Good constitutes an obstacle to itself. Being finite, both Good and Evil must self-erase. So Good and Evil Absolute idea replicate the dynamic of Subjective End, which purported to reduce objectivity to Means. But in so doing, it revealed itself to be Means, because Means requires End to be what it is. Both sides required each other. ‘This is Hegel’s theodicy, and it reinforces the message of God’s discreteness from and dependence on the world’, explains Brian Lefrow.

Absolute Idea

Still, Good is more advanced than external purposiveness. Subjective End was for another, not for itself. The Good is for itself, even as its manifestations are impeded by competing Goods. Because there are competing Goods, the Good implies otherness — an objectivity — confronting it. What is lacking is knowledge that the Evil otherness is Practical Idea’s own self. Practical Idea still lacks the moment of the theoretical Idea.

‘But what the practical idea still lacks is the moment of real consciousness itself, namely that the moment of actuality in the concept would have attained for itself the determination of external being. — This lack can also be regarded in this way, namely that the practical idea still lacks the moment of the theoretical idea. That is to say, in the latter there stands on the side of the subjective concept — the concept that is in process of being intuited in itself by the concept — only the determination of universality; cognition only knows itself as apprehension, as the identity of the concept with itself which, for itself, is indeterminate; the filling, that is, the objectivity determined in and for itself, is for this identity a given; what truly exists is for it the actuality present there independently of any subjective positing. For the practical idea, on the contrary, this actuality constantly confronting it as an insuperable restriction is in and for itself a nullity that ought to receive its true determination and intrinsic value only through the purposes of the good. It is the will, therefore, that alone stands in the way of attaining its goal, because it separates itself from cognition and because for it external actuality does not receive the form of a true existence. The idea of the good can therefore find its completion only in the idea of the true’.

- ‘The Science of Logic’

In theoretical Idea, subjectivity was certain of itself. Now subjectivity needs to be certain that its other is itself. When it realizes this, it will finally cognize itself as its other. Consciousness ‘is seemingly a fight against the ‘object’, but finally [it] perceives that it is not in the grip of [awe prises avec] something exterior but with itself’ said Eugene Fleischmann. Such an event requires that subjectivity and objectivity self-erase in favour of their unity. The Good self-erases because its attack on the other is an attack on itself. Charles Taylor, however, thinks that the Good fails because it is an unattainable beyond. This cannot be accepted, because the Good is attained in Absolute Idea. The sublation of the Good means preservation as well as cancellation. Taylor also suggests that perhaps two Goods may come into conflict. Hegel’s point is that they inevitably come into conflict. When this occurs, there is achieved a unity of the Good (thinking or doing) and the True (being, but also self-erasure). The unity of the two is Absolute Idea. On the verge of ending the entire Logic, Hegel puts self-erasure at the apex. The Absolute Idea is that spirit actualizes itself by doing. This is the Good. But the Good is also the True. The True is the collapse of the positivized thing-in-itself. It is. What is Good and True is when Notion obliterates itself as the sole and only obstacle to its freedom. In ‘The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate’ Hegel writes: ‘When subjectivity is set against the positive, service’s moral neutrality vanishes along with its limited character. Man confronts himself; his character and his deeds become the man himself. He has barriers only where he erects them himself, and his virtues are determinacies which he fixes himself’. For Spirit, the fault is not in the stars but in itself that it is an underling.

‘L’enlèvement de Psyché’, Guy Head, (1753–1800)

Dedicated to the One. My heart and soul. We have nearly reached the end now … the Absolute .. you who I absolutely adore 🌹

Sick at heart and lonely,

Deep in dark despair.

Thinking one thought only

Where is she tell me where.

And if she says to you

She don’t love me

Just give her my message

Tell her of my plea

And I know if she had me back again

Well I would never make her sad.

I’ve gotta heart full of soul.

She’s been gone such a long time

Longer than I can bear

But if she says she wants me

Tell her that I’ll be there

And if she says to you

She don’t love me

Just give her my message

Tell her of my plea.

======

Coming up next:

Absolute Idea.

To be continued …

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David Proud
David Proud

Written by David Proud

David Proud is a British philosopher currently pursuing a PhD at the Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool, on Hegel and James Joyce.

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